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‘Just as it is impossible not to taste the honey (or the poison) that ﬁnds
itself at the tip of the tongue, so it is impossible for a government servant
not to eat up, at least, a bit of the king’s revenue.’1
Corruption, by which we mean the abuse of public power for private gains, has
always been present, in one form or another.2 It is, in general, thought to be endemic,
pervasive and a signiﬁcant contributor to low economic growth, to distortionary invest-
ment and provision of public services, and to increase inequality to such an extent that
international organizations like the World Bank have identiﬁed corruption as ‘the sin-
gle greatest obstacle to economic and social development’ (World Bank, 2001). More
recently, the World Bank has estimated that more than US$ 1 trillion is paid in bribes
each year and that countries that tackle corruption, improve governance and the rule of
law could increase per capita incomes by a staggering 400 percent (World Bank, 2004).
One has to recognize, though, that this argument is not supported unanimously. Rou-
tine corruption may be eﬃciency enhancing. As Leﬀ (1964) puts it: ‘If the government
has erred in its decision, the course made possible by corruption may well be the better
one,’ (p. 11). Corruption may also ‘grease the wheels’ in the rigid public administra-
tion. As Huntington (1968) notes: ‘In terms of economic growth, the only thing worse
than a society with a rigid, over-centralized, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid,
over-centralized, honest bureaucracy,’ (p. 386).3
An important, and surprisingly, unexplored element of corruption is its relationship
with the shadow economy. Clearly, corruption and shadow economy share a common
characteristic: they are both, in general, illegal. The shadow economy it is widely
believed, and existing estimates also conﬁrm, to be both pervasive and signiﬁcant.4 It
1This quotation, attributed to Kautiliya (by R. P. Kangle), appears in Bardhan (1997, p. 1320).
2Corruption, in the common usage of the word, can mean diﬀerent things in diﬀerent contexts. For
a discussion of some of the alternative denotations of the problem of corruption and its damaging con-
sequences see the insightful survey by Bardhan (1997). See also Klitgaard (1988), and Rose-Ackerman
(1999).
3Another eﬃciency argument in favour of corruption is to look upon it as the ‘speed of money’ which
considerably reduces the slow-moving queues in public oﬃces. For a criticism of this eﬃciency-enhancing
view of corruption, see Tanzi (1998), Kaufmann and Wei (1999), and Rose-Ackerman (1999). Bardhan
(1997), Jain (2001), and Aidt (2003) provide comprehensive accounts of the latest developments on
corruption. See also Rose-Ackerman (1978, 1999), and Lambsdorﬀ (1999). Kaufmann et al. (1999)
provide a comprehensive account of empirical work on corruption.
4For the OECD countries—the subject of this paper —it is estimated, for instance, that for countries
such as Greece and Italy the underground economies are almost one-third as large as the oﬃcially
measured GNP. The smallest underground economies are estimated to be in Japan, US and Switzerland
1is not diﬃcult for one to be convinced that there are important reasons why policy
makers should be concerned with the existence of the shadow economy; for example,
erosion of tax and social security bases might cause signiﬁcantly large budget deﬁcits,
and policies based on unreliable indicators of the size of the shadow economy may render
these policies ineﬀective.
In understanding the relationship of corruption with the shadow economy it is
important to understand what causes the shadow economy. With the risk of oversimpli-
ﬁcation, two schools of thought can be identiﬁed. One school of thought identiﬁes high
tax and social security burdens as the principal causes.5 Economic agents, the story goes,
are not willing to pay high taxes and so are driven out of the oﬃcial economy.6 The sec-
ond school of thought identiﬁes institutional quality—bureaucracy, regulatory discretion,
rule of law, corruption and a weak legal system—as the main causes of driving economic
agents underground. This view is based on the presumption that the Leviathan gov-
ernment is not (suﬃciently) constitutionally constrained and, hence, uses its coercive
powers to exploit the citizenry. The natural response of economic agents to this govern-
ment behaviour is to go underground losing all publicly provided beneﬁts. Clearly, then,
there is a potential relationship between corruption (and the misbehavior of government
in general) and the shadow economy. But what is the precise relationship? Is it that a
high corruption leads to high unoﬃcial economy and so they are complements, or to less,
so they are substitutes? Theoretically, both types of relationship may stand. Indeed,
Choi and Thum (2004) show that the shadow economy mitigates government-induced
distortions leading to enhanced economic activities in the oﬃcial sector, corruption and
the shadow economy then being substitutes.7 This is a view that seems to be in line with
Rose-Ackerman (1997) who notes that ‘going underground is a substitute for bribery,
although sometimes ﬁrms bribe oﬃcials in order to avoid oﬃcial taxes,’ (p. 21). Al-
ternatively, Friedman et al. (2000) show that corruption and the shadow economy are
positively related. When faced with weak economic institutions entrepreneurs go under-
(countries that have traditionally relatively small public sectors and high tax morale), Schneider and
Enste (2000, 2002). These estimates, however, need to be interpreted with some caution. See also
footnote 39.
5See, for instance, among others, Tanzi (1982, 1999), Frey and Pommerehne (1984), Schneider
(1994a,b, 1997), and Giles (1999). For a recent contribution that explores the extent to which moral
sentiments may control shadow activities see Kanniainen et al. (2005).
6This view, it has to be said, is closely associated with the literature on tax evasion (a subset of
underground economic activities). The seminal work on tax evasion is Allinghmam and Sandmo (1972).
A thorough account of theoretical contributions can be found in Cowell (1990).
7The oﬃcial market and the shadow economy are, however, complements. We address this in Section
2.
2ground hiding their activities. As a consequence, tax revenues fall as well as the quality
of public administration further reducing a ﬁrm’s incentive to remain oﬃcial. Using an
inspector-tax payer model, Hindriks et al. (1998) also show that the shadow economy is
a complement to corruption. This is because, in this case, the tax payer colludes with
the inspector so the inspector underreports the tax liability of the tax payer in exchange
for a bribe.
The empirical evidence, though limited, is in favor of corruption and the shadow
economy being complements. Johnson et al.’s (1998) investigation of forty-nine countries
in Latin America, the OECD, and the former Soviet Union block ﬁnd a statistically sig-
niﬁcant positive relationship between the various measures of corruption and the shadow
economy. As they note ‘...the relationship between the share of the unoﬃcial economy
and the rule of law (including corruption) is strong and consistent across seven mea-
sures. Countries with more corruption have higher shares of the unoﬃcial economy,’
(p. 391). Using data for 69 countries, Friedman et al. (2000) ﬁnd evidence that ‘more
bureaucracy, greater corruption, and a weaker legal environment are all associated with
a larger unoﬃcial economy...’, (p. 460).8 They conclude that ‘.. poor institutions and
a large unoﬃcial economy go hand in hand,’ (p. 460). Addressing the issue of causality
they show, by using instruments such as long-standing linguistic fractionalization, the
origins of the legal system, religious composition of the population and latitude, that the
causal link runs from weak economic institutions to the size of the shadow economy. As
they put it: ‘[the] results show there is an exogenous component of ‘institutions’ that is
signiﬁcantly correlated with the size of the unoﬃcial economy’, (p. 460).9 Aside from the
theoretical aspects of the relationship between corruption and the shadow economy, an
attempt to empirically establish the relationship faces a diﬃculty; that corruption and
the shadow economy do not lend themselves to measurement and so they are inherently
latent variables.10 A fruitful avenue to deal with this diﬃculty is the use of Structural
Equation Modelling.11 Though the fundamental importance of the quality of institutions
8They also ﬁnd evidence that higher taxes are associated with a smaller underground sector.
9Focusing on regulation, Johnson et al. (1997) show that countries with more regulation of their
economies tend to have a higher share of the unoﬃcial economy in GDP.
10This measurement diﬃculty is to a great extent exacerbated by the lack and diﬃculty of a precise
deﬁnition of the shadow economy. A working—and widely used—deﬁnition is ‘all economic activities
that contribute to the oﬃcially calculated (or observed) gross national product but are currently unreg-
istered’, Schneider and Enste (2000, p. 78). Clearly, this deﬁnition involves legal as well as illegal and
corrupt activities.
11The Structural Equation Model was introduced to economics by Weck (1983), and Frey and Weck-
Hannemann (1984) and latterly explored by Loayza (1996) and Giles (1999), among others, to measure
the size of the shadow economy, Raiser et al. (2000) to investigate the institutional change in Eastern
Europe, and Kuklys (2004) to measure welfare. Schneider and Enste (2000, 2002) oﬀer a comprehensive
3for combating corruption and the shadow economy is well recognized, to the best of our
knowledge, no studies exist that attempt to articulate, and empirically estimate, the
relationship treating the variables in question as inherently latent. This is the objective
of this paper.
We set up a theoretical model which captures in a stark way the relationship
between institutional quality, the shadow economy and corruption. The model relates
to Shleifer and Vishny (1993) who analyze a bureaucracy issuing permits to perform
some economic activity in exchange for bribes. They show that if the oﬃcials do not
coordinate to extract bribes then the aggregate level of bribes will be too high from
the point of view of the oﬃcials. The paper also relates to Bliss and Di Tella (1997)
who show that corruption aﬀects the number of ﬁrms in a free entry equilibrium and
argue that the number of ﬁrms in the market place cannot be treated as exogenous. The
model draws upon Choi and Thum (2004) with the key departure being in the explicit
(but exogenous) speciﬁcation of institutional quality.12 The theoretical model shows
that corruption and shadow economy are substitutes in the sense that the existence of
the shadow economy reduces the propensity of oﬃcials to demand grafts from ﬁrms. It
also shows that institutional quality, under a certain condition, may reduce both the
magnitude of corruption and the size of the shadow economy. The predictions of the
model are then tested and conﬁrmed in a sample of 18 OECD countries.13 To the best of
our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper that attempts to conﬁrm a speciﬁc relationship—
treating these variables as inherently latent—between institutional quality, corruption
and shadow economy.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce a simple
model that investigates the relationship between institutional quality, corruption and
the shadow economy. In Section 3 we present the Structural Equation Model used to
conﬁrm the hypothesized relationship between institutional quality, corruption and the
shadow economy. We also derive the scores of the latent endogenous variables and so
derive an index of corruption and shadow economy in the 18 OECD countries. In Section
4 we present and discuss the results. Finally, in Section 5 we conclude.
account of studies on the hidden economy that have employed this approach. This approach has recently
been used in Dreher et al. (2004) to derive an index of corruption based on around 100 countries.
12A word of clariﬁcation is in order here. This paper does not attempt to address the recent criticism
regarding the extensive use of variables capturing the institutional quality that are based on surveys
and suﬀer from ‘artiﬁcial inertia’, Rodrik (2004). Nevertheless, by treating the variables as latent we,
to some extent, circumvent this problem.
13The small number of countries reﬂect, of course, data availability.
42 A simple model
The model is familiar from Choi and Thum (2004); the key departure is in the explicit
speciﬁcation of institutional quality. Corruption is deﬁned, following Shleifer and Vishny
(1993), ‘as the sale by government oﬃcials of government property for personal gain’ (p.
599). There is a continuum of ﬁrms, each of which is characterized by an ‘earning ability’
parameter θ. The individual characteristic θ—distributed with cumulative probability
F(θ) with F ′(θ) ≥ 0—is known to the ﬁrms but, importantly, not to the oﬃcials. There
are two markets in this economy; an oﬃcial, within which corrupt oﬃcials operate, and
the shadow market. What distinguishes the former from the latter market is the cost of
operation. In particular, in order to operate in the oﬃcial market, ﬁrms must purchase a
permit which is government property from an oﬃcial who is corrupt at price denoted by
m.14 To avoid expropriation by government oﬃcials ﬁrms can enter the shadow market.15
Entering the shadow market is, however, not cost free. The (expected) cost is the ﬁne
associated with the ﬁrm operating in the shadow economy. To minimize the possibility
of getting caught ﬁrms typically scale down their degree of operation, an issue that we
turn to shortly. Independent of their earning ability and market of operation, ﬁrms also
incur ﬁxed operating costs, such as the purchase of capital, denoted by ρ > 0.
Central to this paper is how institutional quality, in the presence of a free market
equilibrium, aﬀects both markets. It is not diﬃcult for one to be convinced that the
quality of the institution impacts diﬀerently in the two markets. Consider, for instance,
the rule of law. One would expect, in this case, that an improvement in the rule of law
reduces the incidence of illegal activities taking place in the two markets but it does so
to diﬀerent degrees since the nature of these activities are diﬀerent (see footnote 15). To
capture this it is assumed that institutional quality, denoted by e, improves the quality
of the oﬃcial market—denoted by q(e),16 with17 q′(e) > 0—and also the quality of the
shadow market, denoted by σ(e), with σ′(e) > 0, but q(e)  = σ(e) and q′(e)  = σ′(e).18
14The oﬃcials so expropriate not only the ﬁrms but also the government property.
15It is implicitly assumed that there is no rent extraction in the shadow economy. If ﬁrms are caught
operating in the shadow economy they are ﬁned but the revenues are not observed and so cannot be
expropriated by the corrupt oﬃcials.
16Another way to interpret this is as technology. The eﬀectiveness of the institution in the two markets
should be interpreted broadly to include, for instance, elements such as, among others, the complexity
of the tax system and regulatory discretion. For a study on the eﬀect of the complexity of the tax
system on the size of the shadow economy see Schneider and Neck (1993).
17A derivative of a function of one variable is indicated by a prime and of many variables with a
subscript.
18It is feasible to endogenize the quality of the institution e, but this will add no further insights to
5There are two stages in the sequence of events. In the ﬁrst stage, and for given
institutional quality, the oﬃcials decide (anticipating the number of ﬁrms operating in
the oﬃcial market) what level of graft m to set in order to maximize graft revenues and
in the second, for given level of graft, ﬁrms decide to either enter the oﬃcial market,
the shadow economy market or not to enter the markets at all.19 To investigate the
precise relationship between the corrupt and shadow markets and their relationship with
the quality of the institutions, the strategy is to consider the behavior of public oﬃcials
when the shadow market is not present and when it is. We start with the former.
2.1 Magnitude of corruption in the absence of the shadow mar-
ket
A ﬁrm of earning ability θ that operates in the oﬃcial economy has proﬁts
π = θ − ρ − mq(e) . (1)
The last term in (1) captures the monetary cost of institutional quality to a ﬁrm with
earnings ability θ. This cost is increasing in e reﬂecting the fact that an improvement
in institutional quality results in the typical ﬁrm being caught engaging in corrupt ac-
tivities.20 Clearly, a marginal ﬁrm will enter the oﬃcial market if and only if it realizes
non-negative proﬁts that is, following from (1), if and only if
θ ≥ ρ + mq(e) ≡ θ . (2)
Condition (2), in turn, deﬁnes a cutoﬀ level of θ, denoted by θ, such that all ﬁrms with
earning ability above this will enter the oﬃcial market by purchasing the permit at the
cost of m. The proportion of ﬁrms, then, that will enter the market is 1 − F(θ). For
notational convenience, denote
G(θ) ≡ 1 − F(θ) , (3)
with G′ (θ) ≤ 0 (to avoid uninteresting cases we take it throughout that G′ < 0).
In the absence of a shadow economy, a corrupt oﬃcial choosing m maximizes
R = mG(θ) , (4)
the paper.
19There is so commitment on the part of corrupt public oﬃcials: once announced, public oﬃcials
cannot renege on the level of graft. This seems a natural assumption on the working of institutions in
OECD countries.
20At ﬁrst sight this speciﬁcation might look peculiar. What we have in mind though is the fact that
(an improvement of) institutional quality does not only aﬀect corrupt oﬃcials but also aﬀect the policing
of ﬁrms caught engaging in corrupt activities.
6with the necessary condition being
Rm = G + mG
′q(e) = 0 ≡ T(m,e,ρ) . (5)
Equation (5) implicitly deﬁnes the equilibrium level of graft m∗(e,ρ). It is assumed that




′) < 0 , (6)
is satisﬁed and so (5) has a unique solution. A property of (5) that will prove useful is
that21
m
∗′(e) = −Te/Tm , (7)
= −m
∗q
′(e)/q(e) < 0 , (8)
and so an increase in institutional quality reduces the equilibrium level of graft de-
manded by the oﬃcials. Total equilibrium graft revenues, denoted by R∗, decrease with






′(e) < 0 . (9)
That total equilibrium graft revenues decrease with institutional quality is intuitive. For
institutional quality, e, does not, as an envelope property, aﬀect graft revenues through
m∗(e) but only through q(e); for given m∗(e) an increase in e increases the cutoﬀ level
of θ reducing the oﬃcial market and thereby graft revenues.
It is also interesting to observe that an improvement in institutional quality does
not aﬀect the equilibrium size of the oﬃcial market, denoted by H. To see this, notice
that the size of the oﬃcial market is given by H(e) = G(θ(e)). Diﬀerentiating H, and
evaluating using (5) and (8), gives, as an envelope property, H′(e) = 0. That an increase
in institutional quality reduces revenues (but leaves the oﬃcial market unchanged) is
perhaps not surprising. But it does serve as a useful benchmark to compare against the
equilibrium outcomes in the presence of the shadow economy. This is what we turn to
next.
2.2 Magnitude of corruption in the presence of the shadow
market
Consider now an economy in which there is an underground sector. As noted previously,
if a ﬁrm enters the shadow market it pays no graft but it requires to scale down the
21Throughout this subsection the dependence of the functions on ρ (being ﬁxed) is suppressed.
7level of the economic activity so as not to be detected. To capture this in a simple way,
it is assumed that for a given σ(e), the cost of entering the shadow economy is θσ(e).
Denoting variables pertaining to the shadow economy with a superscript s, proﬁts are
given by
π
s = θ − ρ − θσ(e) . (10)
It is also natural to assume that the cost of entering the shadow market is not too high
that is, σ(e) < 1. Consider now the choice that a typical ﬁrm, with characteristic θ,
faces. A simple comparison between (1) and (10) reveals that if θ ≥ mq(e)/σ(e) then
this ﬁrm participates in corruption, whereas if ρ/(1 − σ(e)) ≤ θ < mq(e)/σ(e) then it
enters the shadow economy. With a suﬃciently low θ < ρ/(1 − σ(e)) the ﬁrm makes,
following (10), negative proﬁts and hence ceases activity altogether.












m = G + mG
′q(e)/σ(e) = 0 ≡ Z(m,e) , (12)
which implicitly deﬁnes the optimal graft ms∗(e) with, for later use,
m
s∗′ = −Ze/Zm , (13)
= −m
s∗e
−1 (εq − εσ) , (14)
where εh ≡ h′(e)e/h > 0 denotes the elasticity of h = q,σ with respect to institutional
quality e. Equation (14) reveals that the change in equilibrium graft, due to a change
in institutional quality e, takes the opposite sign of εq − εσ. This is intuitive. Consider,
for instance, εq > εσ. In this case corruption is easier to be detected, relative to the
illegal activities taking place in the shadow market, and so the public oﬃcials respond
to an increase in institutional quality by reducing the level of graft demanded, that is
ms∗′ < 0. Analogous reasoning applies to εq < εσ.
It is now straightforward to see that the equilibrium level of graft, denoted by Rs∗,
when the shadow economy exists is less than the level of graft when the shadow economy
does not exist that is, ms∗(e) < m∗(e). To see this evaluate (11) at the optimal level of







dm < 0 , (15)
8with the inequality following upon σ(e) < 1. Clearly, then, since Rs∗ is strictly concave
in m, ms∗(e) < m∗(e) and so optimal graft under the existence of the shadow economy
is smaller than without. This is intuitive. The shadow economy, for given institutional
quality, imposes a constraint on the oﬃcials. When ﬁrms face a high graft, they have
the option of going underground. The lower ms∗(e), the more ﬁrms enter the oﬃcial
economy. Hence, when the shadow economy exists, corruption is lower and so the of-
ﬁcial economy is larger implying that the shadow market and the oﬃcial economy are
complements.22
What about total graft revenues? One would expect that these depend on the
relative magnitudes of εq and εσ. Indeed, perturbing optimal graft Rs∗, and evaluating





(εq − εσ) , (16)
and so, with G′ < 0, total graft revenues decrease (increase) in institutional quality when
εq > εσ ( εq < εσ). The intuition of this is similar to the one given when the shadow
economy was not present. An increase in institutional quality does not aﬀect equilibrium
revenues through ms∗ but only via the cutoﬀ level of θ thereby reducing the proportion
of ﬁrms entering the oﬃcial market.23 Interestingly, however, improved institutional
quality does not aﬀect the size (number of ﬁrms) of the oﬃcial market but it does aﬀect
the magnitude of graft revenues. This is for the same reason as that given above, but
modiﬁed here to incorporate the shadow market. Speciﬁcally, with εq > εσ (εq < εσ),
the cutoﬀ level of θ increases (decreases) thereby reducing (increasing) the number of
ﬁrms entering in the oﬃcial market. But this is not the end of the story. Following (14),
to maintain maximum graft revenues, oﬃcials reduce (increase) the equilibrium level of
graft undoing the change in the cutoﬀ level of θ. Thus, overall, the size of the oﬃcial
market remains the same.
An increase in institutional quality, e, however, unambiguously reduces the size
of the shadow economy. To see this notice ﬁrst that, following the discussion in the
preceding paragraph, with the equilibrium size of the oﬃcial market being unaﬀected by
institutional quality, there are no ﬁrms contemplating entering the oﬃcial market after
an improvement in institutional quality has taken place. What institutional quality
aﬀects, however, is the marginal ﬁrm that decides to stay in the shadow market or of
22This conclusion is also reached by Choi and Thum (2004), though they do not treat the role of
institutional quality.
23It can be easily seen that with, as an envelope property, ms∗(e) being unaﬀected by institutional
quality, the threshold θ is increasing (decreasing) in e if and only if εq > εσ (εq < εσ).
9exiting the market completely. It is straightforward to show that the size of the shadow
economy decreases with changes in institutional quality, e. To see this, denoting the
proportion of ﬁrms entering the shadow economy by S(e) = F(ρ/(1 − σ(e))), we thus
have S′(e) = F ′ρσ′(e)/(1 − σ(e))
2 < 0. Summarizing the preceding discussion:
Proposition 1 Ceteris paribus, when εq > εσ (εq < εσ), countries with better insti-
tutional quality are characterized by an oﬃcial market with a low (high) magnitude of
corruption. Moreover, while the size of the oﬃcial market is independent of institutional
quality, the size of the shadow economy reduces with an improvement in institutional
quality.
Proposition 1 emphasizes that the size of the shadow market unambiguously de-
creases with institutional quality, whereas the size of the corruption market remains
unchanged. The exact relationship, however, between the magnitude of corruption and
institutional quality is ambiguous as it depends on the relative eﬀectiveness of the in-
stitutional quality in the two markets. If, for instance, institutions are more eﬀective in
combating corruption (and so more costly for the ﬁrms engaged in corrupt activities)
relative to the shadow economy, in the sense that εq > εσ, then a further improvement
in institutional quality reduces the magnitude of corruption. Oﬃcials, anticipating that
the oﬃcial market is less proﬁtable for ﬁrms, reduce the level of graft demanded. But the
opposite is also true. If the eﬀectiveness of the institutions is biased towards combating
the shadow economy, εq < εσ, then institutional quality may exacerbate corruption. The
preceding analysis has emphasized that:
(i) the corruption and shadow markets are substitutes in the sense that the exis-
tence of the shadow market is associated with smaller levels of graft;
(ii) the eﬀect of institutional quality on the shadow market is unambiguously neg-
ative whereas;
(iii) the eﬀect of institutional quality on the magnitude of corruption is ambiguous
and depends on the relative eﬀectiveness of institutional quality on the two markets.
We now take the model to the data. We start with a description of the methodology
used. As brieﬂy touched upon in Section 1, the diﬃculty with the variables of corruption,
the shadow economy and institutional quality is that they are inherently latent since they
do not lend themselves easily to measurement. A fruitful and promising approach to
estimating latent variables is to use Structural Equation Modelling.24 This methodology
24Latent random variables represent unit-dimensional concepts. The observed variables or indicators
of a latent variable contain random or systematic measurement errors but the latent variables are free of
these errors. Latent variables correspond to hypothetical variables (constructs) that may vary in their
degree of abstractness. We turn to this in the next Section.
10is ‘becoming a powerful approach’ to these problems, Giles (1999, p. 372) and, applied
to the present context, is outlined in the next Section.
3 A Structural Equation Model
Structural Equation Modelling allows a set of relationships between one or more indepen-
dent variables and one or more dependent variables to be examined. Both independent
and dependent variables can be either latent variables (factors) or measured variables
(indicators). The underlying assumption is that the observed variables are perfectly
correlated (or at least nearly so) with the latent variables that they measure.25
3.1 General model speciﬁcation
It is instructive to provide the general speciﬁcation of the model. A Structural Equation
Model has the following form:
x = Λxξ + δ , (17)
y = Λyη + ǫ , (18)
η = Bη + Γξ + ζ , (19)
where x = (x1,...,xq)′ and y = (y1,...,yp)′ are the observed indicators of the latent
factors ξ = (ξ1,...,ξn)′ and η = (η1,...,ηm)′ respectively. δ (a q × 1 vector) and ǫ (a
p × 1 vector) are the measurement errors for x and y respectively. Λx is a q × n matrix
of coeﬃcients (‘loadings’) relating manifest exogenous variables x to exogenous latent
variables ξ whereas Λy is a p × m matrix of coeﬃcients relating manifest endogenous
variables y to endogenous latent variables η. B is the m×m coeﬃcient matrix showing
the inﬂuence of the latent endogenous variables on each other. Γ is the m×n coeﬃcient
matrix for the eﬀects of ξ on η. The model in (17) is called the exogenous measurement
model, whereas the model in (18) is called the endogenous measurement model. The
errors of measurement are assumed to be uncorrelated with ξ and ζ and with each other.
Also E(δ) = 0q×1 and E(ǫ) = 0p×1. To simplify matters x, y, ξ and η are written
as deviations from their means, Bollen (1989). To incorporate cause indicators into the
current model structure (see below) one needs to deﬁne each indicator, xi, as equal to a
latent variable ξ that is x = Iξ,26 where x is a vector of cause indicators.
25Of course all measures or abstract factors have far from perfect associations with the factor.
26The observed x variables, so, contain no measurement error.
11The hypothesis of the model is that Σ = Σ(φ). Estimation is performed by
choosing φ (the vector that contains the model parameters) minimizing the maximum
likelihood





− log|S| − (p + q) , (20)
where p + q is the number of measured variables.











y + Θǫ , (22)






















x + Θδ (27)
where the equalities in (23) and (25) follow from substituting the reduced form of equa-
tion (19) that is, η = (I − B)−1(Γξ + ζ). Θǫ is the p × p covariance matrix of ǫ, Θδ
is the q × q covariance matrix of δ, and Φ is the n × n covariance matrix of the latent
factors ξ. (I − B) is required to be non-singular and so invertible.
Analysis of the covariance matrix of observed variables leads to unstandardized
coeﬃcients that depend upon the units in which the variables are scaled. To compare
the eﬀects of two or more variables on the same dependent variable when they have
diﬀerent units of measurement, the coeﬃcients are standardized as follows
ˆ λ
s






















where the superscript s represents a standardized coeﬃcient, i is the dependent variable,
j is the independent, and ˆ σii, ˆ σjj are the model predicted variances of the ith and jth
12variables. Once the hypothesized relationship between the variables has been identiﬁed
and estimated, the latent variable scores ηj for each country j = 1,...J can be obtained
following the procedure suggested by J¨ oreskog (2000).
The analysis outlined above allows us to decompose the eﬀects of one variable on
another into direct, indirect, and total eﬀects.27 Directs eﬀects are the inﬂuences of
one variable on another that are not mediated by any other variable. For non-recursive
models as the present one, the direct, indirect and total eﬀects of ξ on η (the variables
of interest) are given by Γ, (I − B)−1Γ − Γ, and (I − B)−1Γ, respectively.28
3.2 Model speciﬁcation
Figure 1 presents a representation of the system of simultaneous equations (path di-
agram)29 of the hypothesized set of relationships that link the variables of interest,
institutional quality, the shadow economy and corruption.
Figure 1 here.
Notice the direction of the arrows connecting the two constructs (factors), the
shadow market30 (‘SHADOW’-η1) and magnitude of corruption (‘CORRUPTION’-η2),
to their indicators. These constructs predict the measured variables. The implication
is that SHADOW is assessed using a country’s tax revenue as a percentage of GDP
(‘TAX’-y1), women labour participation rate (‘LABOUR’-y2) and the national currency
in circulation relative to GDP (‘CURRENCY’-y3). The latent variable SHADOW is also
predicated by the duration (in days) of starting up a business (‘DURATION’-x1), and an
index indicating rigid regulation in the labor market (‘FLEXIBILITY’-x2). The magni-
tude of corruption, CORRUPTION is indicated by the Transparency International Cor-
ruption Perception Index (‘TI’-y4), and an index capturing procedural costs with meeting
governments’ requirements to start operating a business legally (‘PROCEDURES’-y5).
These two endogenous latent variables are both predicated by an exogenous latent vari-
able, capturing institutional quality (‘QUALITY’-ξ3). The exogenous latent variable
27Total and indirect eﬀects are only deﬁned under certain conditions. A suﬃcient condition for the
total eﬀects to exist is that the largest eigenvalue of the matrix B is less than one, Bollen (1989).
28For the eﬀects of ξ on y and x as well as of η on η, y and x see Bollen (1989), Table 8.9.
29It is common practise to represent the measured variables (indicators) by squares and the latent
variables (factors) by circles. The hypothesized relationship between the variables are indicated by lines.
Straight single-headed arrows represent one-way inﬂuences from the variable at the arrow base to the
variable to which the arrow points.
30To avoid confusion, and where appropriate, we provide both the name of the variables and their
symbolic representation in Subsection 3.1.
13is indicated by a rule of law index (‘LAW’-x3) and an index of government eﬀective-
ness (‘EFFECTIVENESS’-x4).31 Finally, the directional link between CORRUPTION
and SHADOW tests the relationship between these two endogenous latent variables.32
As predicted by the theoretical model, we expect a direct relation between QUALITY,
SHADOW and CORRUPTION. We turn now to the results.
4 Results
4.1 Structural equation model estimates
To increase the number of observations the data have been averaged over the period 1998-
2002. The sample, driven by data availability, covers 18 OECD countries. As noted
in Subsection 3.1, prior to estimation the data are standardized.33 Figure 2 presents
the estimated coeﬃcients. To derive the t-ratios for the indicator variables, one of the
coeﬃcients of the indicators must be normalized to 1. We have chosen to normalize
the estimated parameters with respect to CURRENCY; this should be taken to mean
higher currency circulation relative to GDP reﬂects a higher unoﬃcial economy. The
indicator variables are statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level at least, with higher
TAX indicating a smaller shadow economy. This is in line with the evidence found by
Friedman et al. (2000). The variable LABOUR has also the expected sign implying
that a low participation rate, assuming constant labour force, indicates a high shadow
economy. For the latent variable of corruption, CORRUPTION, we have normalized
the estimated parameters with respect to TI (this should be taken to mean that high
values of the Transparency International index reﬂects high corruption). The indicator
variable of the latent CORRUPTION, PROCEDURES is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent
level. Turning now to the indicator of QUALITY, EFFECTIVENESS is positive—
31For the choice of the indicators of the latent variables we have been guided by the existing literature
on corruption and shadow economy. The indicators for SHADOW, TAX and CURRENCY, are all vari-
ables that have been widely used, Schneider and Enste (2000). The indicator LABOUR follows from
the fact that a decline in women labor force participation in the oﬃcial economy can be seen, assum-
ing constant labour force participation, as an indication of increased activity in the shadow economy,
Schneider and Enste (2000). For CORRUPTION, TI is an obvious (perception based) indicator. Fol-
lowing Djankov et al. (2002), PROCEDURES (that cover direct costs of time associated with meeting
government requirements that a start-up must bear before it can operate legally) should be correlated
with CORRUPTION, too. The indicators of QUALITY seem to be obvious choices.
32From a theoretical point of view other variables could measure the underlying constructs equally
well. In the empirical estimation other variables have been tried out. The ﬁnal set of variables is the
one that produces the best ﬁt. Correlations between the error terms, where this increases model ﬁt,
have also been accounted for.
33All variables with their deﬁnitions and sources can be found in the Appendix. All estimations have
been performed with LISRELr V. 8.5.4.
14following the normalization of the estimated coeﬃcient with respect to the variable
LAW—and signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
4.2 Structural equation model evaluation
To evaluate the model we make use of a number of statistics. The χ2 statistic for testing
the model against the alternative that the covariance matrix of the observed variables is
unconstrained, where smaller values indicate a better ﬁt is χ2 = 14.75 (with 16 degrees of
freedom). In other words, a small χ2 does not reject the null hypothesis that the model
reproduces the covariance matrix. The χ2 test of exact ﬁt accepts the model at least at
the ﬁve percent level of signiﬁcance. The Root Mean Square Error of Approximation
(RMSEA) accounts for the error of approximation in the population and has recently
been recognized as one of the most informative criteria in covariance structure modelling,
Steiger (1990). Expressed diﬀerently, the RMSEA measures how well the model ﬁts based
on the diﬀerence between the estimated and the actual covariance matrix (and degrees
of freedom). The value of RMSEA is almost zero indicating a good ﬁt.34 Other indices
providing evidence of an acceptable ﬁt are the Goodness of Fit Index (GFI=0.84), the
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI=0.55) and the Normed Fit Index (NFI=0.87).
These indices range from zero to one, with values close to one indicating a better ﬁt.35
The squared multiple correlations for the structural equations are 0.51, and so moderately
high, for SHADOW and, very high, 0.94 for CORRUPTION. Based on these goodness-
of-ﬁt statistics, we conclude that the model ﬁts the data fairly well.
4.3 Direct and indirect eﬀects
The path analysis in Figure 1, as noted in Section 3.1, allows us to distinguish three types
of eﬀects: direct, indirect and total. The direct eﬀect is the inﬂuence of one variable
on another that is unmediated by any other variable in the path diagram. The indirect
eﬀects of a variable are mediated by at least one intervening variable. The total eﬀect of
institutional quality captured by LAW on the latent variable SHADOW is γ13 = −0.65,
and is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. The interpretation of this is that a marginal
improvement in institutional quality reduces the latent score of the shadow economy by
34Values of the RMSEA less than 0.05 indicate good ﬁt, values as high as 0.08 represent reasonable ﬁt,
values from 0.08 to 0.10 indicate mediocre ﬁt, and those greater than 0.10 indicate poor ﬁt (MacCallum
et al. 1996).
35These indices are based on comparison with a null model predicting all covariances to be zero. The
NFI relates the chi-square of this null model to the chi-square of the actual model. The GFI and the
AGFI compare the loss function of the null model with the loss function of the actual model, with AGFI
adjusting for the complexity of the model.
150.65. The direct eﬀect of QUALITY on the latent CORRUPTION (η2) is γ23 = −1.11,
and is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level, implying that a marginal increase in the rule
of law reduces the magnitude of corruption by 1.11, as measured by the latent score.
The estimated model, therefore, shows that an increase in institutional quality aﬀects
negatively both the shadow economy and corruption markets in OECD countries. The
interpretation of this is that, in the sample of OECD countries, institutions seem to work
better in combating corruption relative to underground economy. Turning now to the
total eﬀect of institutional quality, denoted by Tη2ξ3, on CORRUPTION is given by
Tη2ξ3 = (1 − β21β12)
−1 (β21γ13 + γ23) (31)
= −0.950 , (32)
and is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. Thus, a marginal increase in QUALITY reduces
CORRUPTION by −0.950.36
The coeﬃcient (β21 = −0.25) of the link between the two endogenous latent (COR-
RUPTION and SHADOW) variables is signiﬁcant at 1 percent level implying that the
existence of SHADOW reduces the magnitude of CORRUPTION. This, therefore, is
consistent with the shadow economy and corruption being substitutes.
We turn now to deriving the scores for the latent variables for the countries in our
sample. These latent scores allow us to provide a ranking of the shadow economy and
the extent of corruption for the countries in our sample.
4.4 Latent scores (indices)
To derive the latent scores, as noted in Subsection 3.1, we adopt the procedure suggested
by J¨ oreskog (2000). The results are presented in Table 1.37
Table 1 here.
As can be seen in Table 1, the country with the smallest shadow economy is Canada
(with normalized index value 0), followed by Hungary (0.390), and Belgium (0.144).
Among the countries in our sample, Mexico and the Slovak Republic have the largest
unoﬃcial sectors, with 1 and 0.440, respectively. In terms of corruption, Finland is the
least corrupt country (with normalized index value 0) followed by New Zealand (0.081),
and the UK (0.204). The most corrupt country is Mexico (with normalized index of 1),
36Notice that, as noted in Subsection 3.1, the total eﬀects of ξ on η are deﬁned if and only if the
largest eigenvalue of the matrix of the estimated coeﬃcients of the endogenous latent variables, B, is
less than 1. In the estimated model the largest eigenvalue is 0.062 and so the total eﬀects are deﬁned.
37The results, of course, depend on the choice of the observed variables.
16followed by the Slovak Republic (0.970), Poland (0.867), Czech Republic (0.853) and
Greece (0.810).
One of course may still be not convinced of the accuracy of the indices and in par-
ticular with the index of CORRUPTION.38 A natural additional test one could perform
is the derivation of the correlation of the derived index of CORRUPTION with other
existing indices. These correlations are reported in Table 2. This table reveals that the
ranking of the index of CORRUPTION across the 18 OECD countries is highly corre-
lated with the majority of the existing indices of CORRUPTION. It is worth noting that
the index of corruption has the highest correlation (with correlation 0.9888) with the TI
index, a widely used index.39
Table 2 here.
Taken together the estimates from the Structural Equation Model are consistent with the
theoretical framework, that institutional quality aﬀects negatively the shadow economy
and corruption both directly and indirectly and that corruption and the shadow economy
are substitutes.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has taken a step towards understanding the relationship between institu-
tional quality, corruption and the shadow market. It developed a simple model and
conﬁrmed existing results, associated with Choi and Thum (2004), that corruption and
shadow markets are substitutes in the sense that the existence of the shadow market is
associated with smaller levels of graft. It has also been shown that (i) the eﬀect of insti-
tutional quality on the shadow market is unambiguously negative whereas, (ii) the eﬀect
of institutional quality on the magnitude of corruption is ambiguous and depends on the
relative eﬀectiveness of institutional quality on the two markets. These predictions were
38Since indices comparable to the index for SHADOW do not exist one should exercise caution in
providing correlations between those indices and the index for SHADOW derived in this paper. This is
because studies that are based on single latent models potentially are picking up aspects of corruption
in their shadow economy measure.
39Two observations are in order here. Firstly, one might argue that the correlation of the derived
index for CORRUPTION with TI is high because TI appears as an indicator of the latent variable of
CORRUPTION. Yet, other indicators are a priori of equal importance. What the result here indicates is
that perceived corruption—at least in the OECD countries—is highly correlated with actual corruption.
This corroborates using the TI index as index for corruption in those countries. Secondly, one might be
tempted to benchmark the indices SHADOW and CORRUPTION to existing estimates of the shadow
economy and corruption. Though feasible, this benchmarking exercise suﬀers from a choice-bias, and
is, in the present context, of limited use.
17tested using data from 18 OECD countries. The empirical estimation conﬁrmed the pre-
diction that institutional quality reduces the shadow economy and corruption. The total
eﬀect of institutional quality on corruption was estimated to be negative and signiﬁcant.
186 Appendix
6.1 Figures
Figure 1: The path diagram
19Figure 2: The model estimates
206.2 Tables
Table 1: Indices of SHADOW and CORRUPTION.
SHADOW CORRUPTION
Country Index Rank Index Rank
Mexico 1 1 0 1
Slovak Rep. 0.440 2 0.970 2
Germany 0.243 3 0.374 10
Australia 0.235 4 0.208 15
Poland 0.223 5 0.867 3
Czech Rep. 0.209 6 0.853 4
Switzerland 0.207 7 0.216 14
New Zealand 0.201 8 0.081 17
Finland 0.200 9 0 18
United Kingdom 0.199 10 0.204 16
Italy 0.198 11 0.746 7
Greece 0.195 12 0.810 5
Portugal 0.178 13 0.570 8
Norway 0.163 14 0.222 13
Austria 0.160 15 0.342 11
Belgium 0.144 16 0.542 9
Hungary 0.139 17 0.748 6
Canada 0 18 0.300 12
Table 2: Correlation of index of CORRUPTION with other indices.
Model TI ICRG WVS EBI CI CIM CC
Model 1.0000
TI 0.9888 1.0000
ICRG 0.7177 0.7542 1.0000
WVS 0.5953 0.5741 0.3356 1.0000
EBI 0.8587 0.8590 0.5590 0.4201 1.0000
CI 0.9719 0.9817 0.8028 0.6059 0.8410 1.0000
CIM 0.7634 0.7434 0.3128 0.4570 0.6839 0.5683 1.0000
CC 0.9734 0.9744 0.7361 0.5928 0.8727 0.6774 0.9576 1.0000
Note: TI is the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International; ICRG is the
International Country Risk Guide Corruption index; WVS is the World Value Survey
(asking the question whether accepting a bribe is justiﬁable?); EBI is the Exporter
Bribery Index of Friedman et al. (2000); CI is the Corruption Index of Friedman et al.
21(2000); CIM is the Corruption Index based on the full model of 1997 of Dreher et al.
(2004); and CC is the Control of Corruption of Kaufmann et al. (2003).
6.3 Data deﬁnitions
6.3.1 Indicators of the endogenous latent variables
TAX: Tax revenue in percent of GDP. Source: World Bank (2003), World Development
Indicators.
LABOUR: Women activity rate. Source: International labour organization, LABORSTA
Labour Statistics Database, extracted on 30/05/2004.
CURRENCY: Central Bank-Currency in Circulation in $US, divided by GDP. Source:
Tompson Data Steam.
TI: Corruption Perception Index, Transparency International (2002). Scaling implies
higher values of the index more CORRUPTION.
PROCEDURES: The costs associated with starting to operate legally a ﬁrm. Source:
Djankov et al. (2002).
6.3.2 Indicators of the exogenous latent variables
DURATION: Starting a business, duration (days). Source: Djankov et al. (2002).
FLEXIBILITY: Flexibility of hiring index. Higher values represent more rigid regula-
tion. Source: Doing Business, World Bank online Database.
LAW: Rule of law index. This index measures the extent to which agents have conﬁ-
dence in and abide by the rules of society. It refers to perceptions of the incidence
of both violent and non-violent crime, the eﬀectiveness and predictability of the
judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. Measures the success of a society in
developing an environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for
social and economic interactions. Source: Kaufmann et al. (1999, 2003).
EFFECTIVENESS: This variable combines perceptions of the quality of public service
provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the
independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the
government’s commitment to policies into a single grouping. The main focus is on
‘inputs’ required for the government to be able to produce and implement good
policies. Source: Kaufmann et al. (1999, 2003).
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